The demand for donor oocytes has increased dramatically over the years. Today people in need of ART with the use of donor oocytes can appeal to commercial or public donor oocyte banks. The introduction of oocyte banks has shed a new light on the practice of ART using donor oocytes. The establishment and maintenance of oocyte banks should be sensitive to the ethical considerations. However, it is currently unclear which ethical aspects have to be taken into account.
OBJECTIVE AND RATIONALE:
The aim of this article is to identify the ethical aspects of establishing and maintaining oocyte banks for third-party ART.
SEARCH METHODS: A systematic search was performed in July 2016 and February 2017 in both PubMed and Embase using a search string that combined synonyms for oocytes, donation or banking, reproductive care and ethics. We included a wide variety of English-language articles with a reasoned description of ethical aspects or moral considerations on oocyte donation or banking for third-party ART.
Introduction
The demand for donor oocytes for third-party assisted reproduction is continuously growing. In Europe, the number of treatments with the use of donor oocytes has increased from 6530 in 14 countries in the year 2000, to 40 244 in 26 countries in the year 2013 (Nygren et al., 2004; Calhaz-Jorge et al., 2017) . Reasons for this increased demand are delayed parenthood, broadened treatment indications, and growing societal acceptance of alternative family structures (American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), 2013a; de Pennings et al., 2014) . Additionally, many people seek treatment with donor oocytes across international borders because of national legislation or a shortage of donors in their country of residence (Shenfield et al., 2010) . Today, people in need of ART) using donor oocytes can appeal to commercial or public donor oocyte banks.
Resulting from major improvements in vitrification technologies, human oocytes can now be stored safely and efficiently, and successfully used after thawing for IVF treatment (Mertes et al., 2012) . The introduction of oocyte banks sheds a new light on the practice of ART with donor oocytes. Both the flexibility and safety of the oocyte donation treatment have been optimized (de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008; Mertes et al., 2012) . More fundamentally, the cryopreservation of oocytes offers an important alternative for the ethical, legal and religious concerns regarding embryo cryopreservation (Lavery et al., 2016; de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008) .
Still, the practice of oocyte banking is ethically sensitive because of three main reasons. First, oocyte banking for third-party ART is dependent on voluntary donations by healthy women who receive no therapeutic benefit from the donation procedure (leaving egg sharing practices out of consideration), and is ultimately aimed at the birth of a child (Bakker et al., 2017) . In ART with patients' own gametes, physicians have a dual responsibility towards the infertile patient and the child conceived by means of their assistance (Bredenoord et al., 2008) . In ART with donor oocytes, this responsibility is extended towards the welfare of the donor. Second, the development of the oocyte vitrification technique has enabled the possibility to store donor oocytes for a longer period of time. The long-term storage of donor oocytes challenges current informed consent procedures of donors and recipients (Stroud and O'Doherty, 2015) . Third, the high demand for donor oocytes and remaining scarcity in many countries manifests the ethical problem of the fair distribution of donor oocytes (Pennings, 2001) .
While the number of oocyte banks is growing, the practical implications of the three ethically sensitive components of oocyte banking have not yet been well defined. The aim of this paper is to identify the ethical aspects arising in establishing and maintaining oocyte banks for third-party ART as mentioned in the literature. The results of this systematic overview can guide clinicians and regulators towards an ethically responsible practice of oocyte banking for third-party ART.
Methods

Design
In order to identify the ethical aspects of oocyte banking for third-party ART we performed a systematic literature search. In the field of bioethics different types of systematic reviews exist, differing in relation to the type of question the review addresses (normative or descriptive) and the type of literature that is being reviewed (normative or empirical) (McDougall, 2013) . Because our review aims to answer a descriptive question of normative literature, namely 'what are the ethical aspects of oocyte banking for third-party ART', the Systematic Review of Reasons approach of Sofaer and Strech is most suitable. A Systematic Review of Reasons is used to systematically identify the reasons and arguments for or against a normative position, claim or phenomenon given in the literature . The Systematic Review of Reasons approach incorporates the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and MetaAnalyses (PRISMA) statement, and allows for a thematic analysis typical for qualitative research (Moher et al., 2009) . However, since the approach of Sofaer and Strech has been criticized for being practically challenging and there is currently no other widely used alternative, we modified it slightly. To identify key themes among different article types we did not use their comprehensive approach, but performed a thematic synthesis (Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009 ).
Search strategy
The literature search according to PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009) was performed in the databases PubMed and Embase using a search string that combined synonyms for oocytes, donation or banking, reproductive care and ethics (Table I ). The search was performed in July 2016 and repeated in February 2017. Additional data were collected by identifying relevant references cited in key articles and guidelines from several Reproductive Medicine and Biomedical Ethics associations (Tables  III and IV) .
Study selection and inclusion criteria
The title and abstract of the studies were screened, followed by a full text screening using inclusion and exclusion criteria by one researcher (E.M.K.) (Table I) . A second researcher (A.M.E.B.) checked the selection results for consistency. Discrepancies were discussed and successfully overcome within the research group. We excluded articles not written in English, when no full texts were available, and if no ethical aspects, reasoned opinions or moral considerations regarding oocyte banking for third-party ART were given (Fig. 1) . We understood ethical aspects as overarching categories for actions or situations where something has to be considered because of ethical reasons, principles or values (Mertz et al. 2016) . These ethical reasons are mostly derived from the midlevel principles of biomedical ethics, as defined by Beauchamp and Childress, including beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013) . Articles with a single mentioning of the word 'ethics' were excluded. We included all sorts of articles in which ethical aspects and moral considerations regarding oocyte banking for third-party ART were provided, including commentaries, editorials, book chapters, essays, etc. (McCullough et al. 2004 ). In the literature that resulted from our search, we found few or no ethical aspects with regard to the banking or long-term storage of donor oocytes. Therefore, we complemented our search with key articles concerning oocyte banking for research purposes and biobanking, in which the ethical aspects regarding (long-term) storage are more extensively debated.
There is currently no clear view on how to do a quality assessment of the included literature in a Systematic Review of Reasons. For reasons of transparency, we mention here that we considered publications that appeared in an international peer-reviewed journal or a book chapter of sufficient quality to be included in the review (McDougall, 2013; Mertz, 2017 ). Yet, the arguments and moral considerations in these publications can be ethically mistaken or poor. At the same time, we decided to include these considerations since our review is first of all descriptive (and not normative). Moreover, inclusion reduces the risk of individual bias in the attempt to assess the quality.
Data extraction and analysis
The full texts of the selected articles were read carefully by EMK, and data extraction was checked by AMEB and ALB. Our first strategy was to collect the contextual data of the included articles, such as the aim and scope, the country of origin, and the article type (Tables II-IV) . We used a thematic analysis approach to identify key themes among different article types (Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009) . Ethical aspects and moral considerations regarding the practice of oocyte banking for ART were coded, and closely related codes categorized into themes determined by consensus within our study team.
Results
Search and selection
After de-duplication, the search yielded 603 articles, which were supplemented by 28 articles through the reference checking of key articles. We included six key articles regarding oocyte banking for research purposes and biobanking. In total, 149 articles were included for further analysis (Fig. 1) 
Characteristics of included articles
The majority of the articles originate from Western countries, especially from the USA (n = 49), UK (n = 41) and Belgium (n = 15). A total of 14 articles are multinational and conducted across Europe. Most articles included in our review are discussions (n = 35), reviews (n = 30), reasoned opinions (n = 26) and ethical analyses (n = 22). Characteristics of the included articles can be found in Tables II-IV .
Synthesis of the ethical aspects
Our review identified a great variety of ethical aspects. We identified three overall themes referring to the different stages in oocyte banking, namely the intake, storage and distribution of donor oocytes. We then clustered closely related ethical aspects and moral considerations applicable to one of the three stages in sub themes. The overall themes illustrate the course of the donated oocytes within the oocyte bank, while the subthemes relate to the moral actors involved in that particular stage. The themes and subthemes are described below. Importantly, one should be aware that our systematic review does not provide 'all things considered' conclusions about what is ethically responsible practice, but a comprehensive overview of the ethical aspects as discussed in the literature. Moreover, the results of our review neither involve nor replace the critical analysis and weighing of the identified aspects and considerations, but provide a starting point to do so .
Intake
The majority of the literature discusses ethical aspects with regard to the intake of donor oocytes, taking into account both the interests of the donor and the potential child. The following ethical aspects concerning the donor have been identified: first, the risks and psychosocial impact of donation; second, the motivations and reasonable compensation in donor recruitment; and third, the requirements for informed consent. Ethical aspects in relation to the potential child are 2-fold: first, welfare standards and the selection of donors, and second, anonymity and disclosure.
Considerations with regard to the donor
The risks and psychosocial impact of donation. Many articles address the physical risk and psychosocial impact of oocyte donation for donors (Novaes, 1989; Schenker, 1993; Cohen, 1997; Ahuja and Simons, 1998; Barratt et al., 1998; Deech, 1998; Hamilton, 1998; Ahuja et al., 1999; Kalfoglou and Geller, 2000; O'Donnell, 2000; Reame, 2000; McGee et al., 2001; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Byrd et al., 2002; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2004; Dickenson, 2006; Sauer and Kavic, 2006; van den Akker, 2006; de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008; Smajdor, 2008; American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), 2004 Murphy, 2009; Purewal and van den Akker, 2009; Black, 2010; Klein and Sauer, 2010; Mertes et al., 2012; Pennings et al., 2007a 
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The physical risks of oocyte retrieval mentioned in the literature are the risks of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome as a result of multiple donations or conventional stimulation protocols, and the relatively small risks of infertility after oocyte retrieval (Schenker, 1993; Cohen, 1997; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Pennings et al., 2007a; Smajdor, 2008; Black, 2010; Klein and Sauer, 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Boutelle, 2014; Londra et al., 2014 hormone stimulation (Ahuja and Simons, 1998; Ahuja et al., 1999; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Black, 2010; Boutelle, 2014; Fauser and Garcia Velasco, 2017) . Recent studies seem to suggest the unlikeliness of an increased risk for cancer of oocyte donors, although follow-up data on the health and wellbeing of oocyte donors are required for confirmation and reassurance (Fauser and Garcia Velasco, 2017) . Still, the literature emphasizes that the 'no harm principle' requires that serious efforts should be made to minimize the risks for donors (Pennings et al., 2007a; de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008) . Several efforts to minimize harm to the donor are proposed in the literature. First, a careful selection of donors by excluding young childless women, or women with known risks factors (Barratt et al., 1998; ASRM, 2004; Black, 2010; McGee et al., 2013; Pennings et al., 2007a Pennings et al., , 2014 . Second, to implement mild stimulation protocols and limiting the number of cycles per donor to a maximum of five (Ahuja and Simons, 1998; Ahuja et al., 1999; Reame, 2000 To outline the ethical aspects of tissue donation for medicine and research, and provide recommendations for practice Pennings et al., 2007a Pennings et al., , 2014 . Third, to monitor possible donations to multiple clinics, to ensure donors do not exceed the maximum number of donations (ASRM, 2009; Sauer and Kavic, 2006) . Regarding the psychosocial impact of donation, the literature addresses the possible emotional impact on the donor of the existence of a donor child, especially in the relatively rare situation where the donor donated as a nulliparous and later discovers she is not able to conceive herself (Hamilton, 1998; O'Donnell, 2000; ASRM, 2004; Purewal and van den Akker, 2009; Mertes et al., 2012) . To prevent a great emotional burden for donors in relation to the existence of (multiple) donor offspring, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) advises to limit the number of donor offspring per donor (ASRM, 2009 ). This limitation also takes into account the potential emotional impact on the donor offspring when learning that they have multiple genetic siblings. The ASRM does not suggest a specific number for limitation, but in Belgium the limit is set at six recipients per donor (Pennings, 2007) . The literature suggests that additional studies regarding the long-term psychological impacts on donors should be performed (van den Akker, 2006; Purewal and van den Akker, 2009 ).
Motivations and reasonable compensation in donor recruitment
A second ethical aspect identified in the literature is the responsible recruitment of donors (Abdalla and Studd, 1989; Novaes, 1989; Robertson, 1989; Schenker, 1993 Schenker, , 1995 Shenfield and Steele, 1995; Englert, 1996; Deech, 1998; Guerin, 1998; Hamilton, 1998; McLaughlin et al., 1998; Ahuja et al., 1999; Daniels, 2000; Reame, 1999 Reame, , 2000 Jones and Cohen, 2001; Lindheim et al., 2001; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Byrd et al., 2002; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2002; ASRM, 2004; Papadimos and Papadimos, 2004; Steinbock, 2004; van den Akker, 2006; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Merlet, 2009; Black, 2010; Klein and Sauer, 2010; Levine, 2010; Dickenson, 2006 Dickenson, , 2011 Burrell, 2012; Keehn et al., 2012; Pattinson, 2012; Hostiuc, 2013; McGee et al., 2013; Waldby et al., 2013; Alberta et al., 2013 Alberta et al., , 2014 Boutelle, 2014; Londra et al., 2014; Pennings et al., 2007a Pennings et al., , 2014 Klitzman and Sauer, 2015; Pennings, 2005 Pennings, , 2015 . The discussion regarding donor recruitment revolves around what is considered a 'right' motivation as well as a 'reasonable' compensation for donation. With regard to donors' motivations, many authors emphasize that donation should be performed within a gift-relationship, with donors being altruistically motivated (Shenfield and Steele, 1995; Deech, 1998; Guerin, 1998; Byrd et al., 2002; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2002; Papadimos and Papadimos, 2004; van den Akker, 2006; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Pennings et al., 2007a; Merlet, 2009; Purewal and van den Akker, 2009; Pennings, 2005 Pennings, , 2015 . Others argue that altruism is only one amongst several motivations of donors, and consider mixed motivations (e.g. partly altruistic and partly financial) acceptable, as long as care for others remains an important consideration (Boutelle, 2014; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Mertes et al., 2012; Pennings, 2015) .
In countries without commercial oocyte donation (i.e. without payment for oocytes), there is serious shortage of donor oocytes (Daniels, 2000; Shenfield et al., 2010; Pennings et al., , 2014 . As a result, long waiting lists for recipient parents exist (Pennings, 2001) . Strategies for donor recruitment have been profoundly debated (Novaes, 1989; Robertson, 1989; Schenker, 1993; Shenfield and Steele, 1995; Deech, 1998; Guerin, 1998; Hamilton, 1998; McLaughlin et al., 1998; Ahuja et al., 1999; Daniels, 2000; Reame, 1999 Reame, , 2000 Lindheim et al., 2001; Soderstrom-Anttila et al., 2001; Byrd et al., 2002; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2002; ASRM, 2004; Maunder, 2004; Papadimos and Papadimos, 2004; Steinbock, 2004; Kääriäinen et al., 2005; Sauer and Kavic, 2006; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Merlet, 2009; Black, 2010; Klein and Sauer, 2010; Dickenson, 2006 Dickenson, , 2011 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011; Burrell, 2012; Keehn et al., 2012; Pattinson, 2012; Hostiuc, 2013; McGee et al., 2013; Waldby et al., 2013; Boutelle, 2014; Londra et al., 2014; Pennings et al., 2007a Pennings et al., , 2014 Klitzman and Sauer, 2015; Pennings, 2005 Pennings, , 2015 Klitzman, 2016) . To diminish scarcity some stipulate the importance of public awareness regarding the need for (altruistic) donors (Abdalla and Studd, 1989; Shenfield and Steele, 1995; Ahuja et al., 1999; Pennings, 2005 Pennings, , 2015 , while others suggest to increase the amount of money provided to donors (Ahuja et al., 1999; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Pennings, 2015) . The 'intervention ladder' of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics illustrates potential strategies in donor recruitment, ranging from 'altruistic focused' to 'non-altruistic focused' interventions. The altruistic focused rungs of the ladder are: (i) information about the need for the donation of bodily material; (ii) recognition of, and gratitude for, altruistic donation; (iii) interventions to remove barriers and disincentives to donation; and (iv) interventions to prompt or encourage those already Klitzman and Sauer, 2015; Pennings, 2005 Pennings, , 2007 Pennings, , 2015 . Second, payments and incentives act as an undue inducement compromising informed consent (ASRM, 2004; Robertson, 1989; Deech, 1998; Reame, 1999 Waldby et al., 2013; Pennings, 2005 Pennings, , 2015 Third, payment potentially exploits women (Robertson, 1989; Pettee and Weckstein, 1993; Shenfield and Steele, 1995; Englert, 1996; Rothenberg, 1996; Reame, 1999; ASRM, 2004; Steinbock, 2004; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Dickenson, 2011; Pennings et al., 2007a McGee et al., 2013; Waldby et al., 2013; Pennings, 2005 Pennings, , 2015 . Fourth, payment may incentivize donors to falsify information, which could compromise the welfare of the donor child (Shenfield and Steele, 1995; Guerin, 1998; ASRM, 2004; Steinbock, 2004; McGee et al., 2013) . Fifth, payment to donors increases the treatment costs reducing the accessibility of third-party ART for recipients (Shenfield and Steele, 1995; Daniels, 2000; Pennings, 2001) . Multiple arguments in favour of providing money to donors are mentioned in the literature. First, money compensates the donor's personal and financial sacrifices (Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Pennings et al., 2007a Waldby et al., 2013) . Second, money encourages the act of donation which increases the amount of donor oocytes, enabling the treatment of more recipient parents (Novaes, 1989; Robertson, 1989; Englert, 1996; Guerin, 1998; Daniels, 2000; Steinbock, 2004; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007;  Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011; Keehn et al., 2012; Pennings, 2015) Third, the expression of altruistic donation is not necessarily compromised by a financial compensation (Table V) (Klein and Sauer, 2010; Novaes, 1989; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011; Pennings, 2015) .
All things considered, the literature seems to suggest that a 'reasonable compensation' for expenses, and physical and emotional discomfort (corresponding to rungs 3-4 on the Nuffield intervention ladder) is justifiable (McLaughlin et al., 1998; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Byrd et al., 2002; ASRM, 2004; Steinbock, 2004; Sauer and Kavic, 2006; Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Pennings et al., 2007a; Burrell, 2012; Waldby et al., 2013; Londra et al., 2014) . While the ASRM suggests that a reasonable compensation should not exceed 5000 US dollars per cycle, in European countries a total of~900 euros per cycle is considered acceptable (ASRM, 2004; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). A proposed strategy to avoid commodification is to provide a fixed compensation per cycle irrespective of the number and quality of the retrieved oocytes, and the (phenotypical) characteristics of the donor (ASRM, 2004; Steinbock, 2004; Keehn et al., 2012; Pennings et al., 2007a . Additionally, the ASRM advises that clinics offering financial incentives should safeguard the possibility of undue influences and exploitation of donors through careful counselling to guarantee sufficient informed consent (ASRM, 2004) .
Requirements for informed consent. A third ethical aspect related to the intake of oocytes identified in the literature, are the requirements of informed consent for donors (Novaes, 1989; Ahuja and Simons, 1998; Barratt et al., 1998; Benshushan and Schenker, 1998; Hamilton, 1998; Ahuja et al., 1999; Kalfoglou and Geller, 2000; Lindheim et al., 2001; Papadimos and Papadimos, 2004; de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008; ASRM, 2004 ASRM, , 2009 Black, 2010; Dickenson, 2006 Dickenson, , 2011 Schaefer et al., 2012; McGee et al., 2013; Alberta et al., 2014; Boutelle, 2014; Dondorp et al., 2014; Londra et al., 2014; Pennings et al., 2007a Pennings et al., , 2014 Siegel, 2015) . The majority of the literature suggests that potential donors should be provided with information on the medical risks, the legal and emotional aspects, the expected discomfort and possible psychosocial implications of their donation (Hamilton, 1998 The commodification of bodily material 16, 20, 22, 42, 48, 53, 54, 59, 64, 80, 81, 83, 96, 110, 112, 122, 133, 142, 143 Compromised informed consent by undue inducements 16, 22, 42, 53, 72, 74, 80, 83, 86, 94, 95, 110, 112, 122, 133, 142, 143 Potential exploitation of poor women 23, 26, 42, 59, 80, 83, 86, 88, 94, 96, 106, 112, 122, 133, 138 Donors to falsify information putting the welfare of the child at risk 33, 59, 86, 106, 112, 133 Rise of treatment costs for recipients 20, 79, 106 A compensation for personal and financial sacrifices 42, 111, 122, 138 An encouragement for the altruistic act of donation 20, 26, 33, 42, 46, 70, 83, 86, 96, 112, 143 An increase in the amount of oocyte donors 47, 70, 83, 143 Superscript numbers refer to the studies in Tables II-IV. donors may have unrealistic beliefs about their contribution, therefore, the expected outcomes of the treatment with donor oocytes should be explained (Ahuja et al., 1999; Pennings et al., 2007a; ASRM, 2009) . Multiple authors suggest that clinics should provide psychological counselling to prospective donors to enhance the likelihood of significant understanding of the potential impact of donation in order to give sufficient informed consent (ASRM, 2004 (ASRM, , 2009 Black, 2010; Deech, 1998; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001) . Over the years, it is increasingly proposed to treat donors as interested stakeholders with a certain degree of control over their donated tissue, and not merely as providers of genetic material (ASRM, 2009; Dickenson, 2006; Dondorp et al., 2014) . The acceptable level of control is an important aspect of the informed consent procedure for oocyte donors. We will elaborate on this aspect in the second section of this review regarding the storage of donor oocytes.
Considerations with regard to the future child Welfare standards and the selection of donors. The literature demonstrates that consensus exists that the fertility specialist has professional responsibilities in ART with regard to the welfare of the potential child (Blyth and Cameron, 1998; Hamilton, 1998; Pennings et al., 2007b; Dondorp et al., 2014) . To what extent the welfare of the child should be protected is evaluated on the basis of three thresholds. First, the 'minimum welfare principle' entails the view that (assisted) reproduction is morally acceptable when the expected life standard of the resulting child will not be worse than death. Second, the 'reasonable welfare standard' entails the view that (assisted) reproduction is morally acceptable when the expected life standard of the resulting child is reasonable and there is no high risk of serious harm. Third, the 'maximum welfare principle' entails the view that one should not knowingly and intentionally bring a child into the world in less than ideal circumstances (Table VI) (Bredenoord et al., 2008; Pennings, 1999) .
The welfare standard which is employed in practice effects the standards for the selection of donors. The literature indicates that in the selection of donors for third-party ART the 'reasonable welfare standard' is generally employed (Novaes, 1989; Schenker, 1993; Blyth and Cameron, 1998; Deech, 1998; Hamilton, 1998; Pennings, 1999; Pennings et al., 2007a Pennings et al., , 2007b Dondorp et al., 2014) . However, the practical implications of this principle for donor selection are not much discussed in the literature. Several articles argue that oocyte donors should be younger than 35-38 years to minimize the risk for aneuploidy in oocytes, thereby seriously compromising the success rates of treatment (Deech, 1998; Dondorp et al., 2014; Zweifel, 2015) . Furthermore, it is reasoned that clinics should assess the donors' personal and family medical history while carefully keeping medical records in case follow up is needed Novaes, 1989; Robertson, 1989; Schenker, 1993; Cohen, 1997; Deech, 1998; Jones and Cohen, 2001; Dondorp et al., 2014) . However, some argue that autosomal recessive disorders, such as cystic fibrosis, will often not be found if only the donors' family history is identified. The ASRM therefore recommends carrier testing of oocyte donors (ASRM, 2009; Dondorp et al., 2014) . Still, despite current guidelines on genetic screening of donors, cases have been reported of donor offspring with rare severe genetic diseases . As a result, a relatively new discussion regarding the advisability of whole genome sequencing of oocyte donors emerges in the literature (O'Donnell, 2000; Kääriäinen et al., 2005; Dondorp et al., 2014; Londra et al., 2014; Gil-Arribas et al., 2016) . It is proposed that sequencing of oocyte donors enables a more comprehensive screening process at relatively low cost . Thus far, this practice has been discouraged because of its novelty, the impact on donors and potential false insurance for recipients Kääriäinen et al., 2005) .
Anonymity and disclosure. The acceptability of anonymous or nonanonymous donation has been profoundly debated in the literature over the years, and is still a controversial topic (Ahuja et al., 1999; van den Akker, 2006; ASRM, 2009 ASRM, , 2013c Mahlstedt and Greenfeld, 1989; Novaes, 1989; Robertson, 1989; Knoppers and Le Bris, 1993; Schenker, 1993; Shenfield and Steele, 1995; Cohen, 1997; Shenfield, 1997; McWhinnie, 1998; Golombok et al., 1999; O'Donnell, 2000; Reame, 2000; Frith, 2001; Soderstrom-Anttila et al., 2001; Byrd et al., 2002 ; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2002; Maunder, 2004; Murray et al., 2006; Readings et al., 2011; Van Hoof and Pennings, 2011; Shufaro and Schenker, 2012; Crawshaw et al., 2013; McGee et al., 2001 McGee et al., , 2013 Ravelingien and Pennings, 2013; de Melo-Martín, 2014; Londra et al., 2014; Ravitsky, 2014; Wilde et al., 2014; Freeman, 2015; Ilioi and Golombok, 2015; Zweifel, 2015; Raes et al., 2016; Pennings, 2005 Pennings, , 2012 Pennings, , 2017 . The discussion in the literature mainly revolves around whether there is a right to know one's genetic origin (ASRM, 2013c; Mahlstedt and Greenfeld, 1989; Robertson, 1989; Schenker, 1993; Cohen, 1997; Shenfield, 1997; McWhinnie, 1998; Frith, 2001; McGee et al., 2001 ; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2002; Ravelingien and Pennings, 2013; de Melo-Martín, 2014; Ravitsky, 2014; Zweifel, 2015; Pennings, 2012 Pennings, , 2017 ) and the potential negative influence on the wellbeing of the child of secrecy regarding the role of the donor (Mahlstedt and Greenfeld, 1989; Pettee and Weckstein, 1993; Golombok et al., 1999; McGee et al., 2001; Soderstrom-Anttila et al., 2001; de Melo-Martín, 2014; Pennings, 2017) . Interestingly, the debate in the literature concerning anonymity shows a contradiction with regard to the importance of genetic relatedness: while genetic relatedness is considered insignificant in the recipient parent-child relationship, it is considered very important in the donor-child relationship (Freeman, 2015) .
This academic disagreement is reflected in the international diversity of donor anonymity legislation. In countries in which donor anonymity is legally permitted only non-identifiable information of the donor is registered and shared with the recipients (Byrd et al., 2002; Superscript numbers refer to the studies in Table II . Burrell, 2012) . In countries in which anonymity is prohibited, the child can make an appeal for this information at a particular age as well (Pennings, 2012) .
For the child to be able to seek this information (s)he is dependent on the honesty of the parents regarding his or her conception (van den Akker, 2006; ASRM, 2013c; Frith, 2001; Soderstrom-Anttila et al., 2001; Readings et al., 2011; Pennings, 2012; Londra et al., 2014) . Also, several studies indicate that recipients' decision to (non-)disclose is influenced by the attitude of the public, and professionals of fertility clinics in particular, regarding the importance of honesty about the origin of the child's conception (Wilde et al., 2014; Freeman, 2015) . These two aspects give rise to the question, frequently discussed in the literature, to what extent clinics should counsel recipient parents into disclosing the origin of their child's conception (van den Akker, 2006; ASRM, 2013c; Mahlstedt and Greenfeld, 1989; McGee et al., 2001; Ravelingien and Pennings, 2013; Londra et al., 2014; Wilde et al., 2014; Benward, 2015; Zweifel, 2015; Raes et al., 2016; Pennings, 2017) . The literature agrees that oocyte banks should at least inform both donors and recipients about the current policy of information sharing, and acknowledge that most professionals do not have a neutral position regarding recipients' decision on disclosure (ASRM, 2009; Wilde et al., 2014; Benward, 2015) . Furthermore, despite the fact that several studies have not found an empirically measurable effect of (non-)disclosure on the wellbeing of the child, many advise to counsel parents towards disclosure (Londra et al., 2014; McGee et al., 2001; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011; Pennings, 2017; Wilde et al., 2014; Zweifel, 2015) .
Storage
Relatively little literature discusses the ethical aspects of the storage of donor oocytes. Yet, the practice of oocyte banking shows similarities with the storage of human tissue in biobanks for medical research, a practice which is more extensively discussed in the academic literature. The following section provides an overview of the ethical aspects of storing donor oocytes for ART mentioned in the literature on oocyte banking, supplemented by ethical aspects inspired by literature regarding biobanking and oocyte banking for research purposes. The identified aspects are (i) quality standards and confidentiality; (ii) issues of ownership and control; and (iii) the increase of international transport of donor oocytes.
Quality standards and confidentiality
Several studies on ART explicate the importance of carefully supervising the medical procedures involving genetic material of a third party (Knoppers and Le Bris, 1993; Schenker, 1993; Deech, 1998; Tomlinson and Sakkas, 2000; de Wachter, 2004 ; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2002, 2004; Pennings, 2007; Gosden and Gosden, 2012; Dondorp et al., 2014; Stroud and O'Doherty, 2015; Vajta et al., 2015; ASRM, 2009 ASRM, , 2016a . It is suggested that oocyte banks should establish up to date protocols that stipulate requirements for laboratory and treatment facilities and professional qualities (Barratt et al., 1998; Deech, 1998; Tomlinson and Sakkas, 2000 ; ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2004; Barritt et al., 2007; Gosden and Gosden, 2012; Vajta et al., 2015; ASRM, 2016a ASRM, , 2016b . There is limited literature that addresses the work safety and responsibilities of the embryologist working with vitrification techniques in the laboratory (ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2004; de MeloMartin and Cholst, 2008; Vajta et al., 2015) . In these articles it is argued that the execution of these vitrification techniques is not without risk, therefore safety regulations should be a prime concern for clinics (ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2004; de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008; Vajta et al., 2015) . Furthermore, the literature suggests that oocyte banks should maintain accurate records of the origin of the donor oocytes and the conditions under which these were obtained (Deech, 1998; ASRM, 2009; Knoppers and Bris, 1993; Novaes, 1989; Schenker, 1993; Pennings et al., 2007a; Stroud and O'Doherty, 2015) . Proper registration of the origin of the oocytes facilitates the possibility of control and supervision (Pennings, 2007) and is also considered important to guarantee the confidentiality of the personal information of donors (Stroud and O'Doherty, 2015) . There is limited literature that discusses the maximum storage period of donated oocytes. However, several articles indicate the maximum storage period of embryos resulting from ART and frozen oocytes for self-use. A maximum storage period between 5 and 10 years is proposed (ESHRE, 2004; Pennings et al., 2007a Pennings et al., , 2007b Jones and Cohen, 2001; de Wachter, 2004) .
Ownership and control
Questions of who owns and controls the destination of the oocytes may arise once donor oocytes are stored in banks. We used additional key articles regarding oocyte banking for research purposes and biobanking in which the aspect of ownership and control is identified (Baylis and Widdows, 2015; Dickenson, 2006; O'Doherty et al., 2011; Rothstein, 2005; Stroud and O'Doherty, 2015; Waldby and Mitchell, 2006) .
While several authors argue that bodily material cannot be owned the way we own non-bodily goods (Dickenson, 2006; Waldby and Mitchell, 2006) , some argue that the banks become the owner of the biomaterials once it is donated, while others argue that banks are mainly taking the material into 'custody' with the donors retaining ownership or 'rights of say' (Waldby and Mitchell, 2006; Stroud and O'Doherty, 2015) . Moreover, it is emphasized that because the donor donates the tissue to a bank within a 'gift relationship', the banks are required to recognize the act of 'altruistic care for the wellbeing of others' that is embedded in the donation of the donor. In storing and using donated tissue, banks should thus respect the wishes of the donor (Dickenson, 2006; Rothstein, 2005) .
The literature shows that reproductive material is valued differently from 'normal' bodily tissue because of the assumed potential for life and greater emotional attachment (Dickenson, 2006; Baylis and Widdows, 2015) . This seems to influence the perspectives on ownership and the resulting degree of control. These attitudes are evident in the discussion on postmortem usage of donor oocytes (and sperm) (Parker, 2004; Mizukami et al., 2005; Pennings et al., 2006; Nakhuda, 2010; Burrell, 2012; Dillon and Fiester, 2012) . When the donor dies, the oocytes can continue to be used for reproductive treatment, donated to research or destroyed, dependent on legislation or the donors preferences (Pennings et al., 2006 . Multiple authors recommend clinics to encourage donors to make their preferences explicit as a part of the informed consent procedure at the start of donation (Deech, 1998; Burrell, 2012; Dillon and Fiester, 2012) . Others propose to organize consent on postmortem usage as an ongoing process because of the possibility that donors may change preferences, and thus increase the possibilities for donors to control their donated reproductive tissue (Baylis and Widdows, 2015; Stroud and O'Doherty, 2015) . For the same reasons, it is argued that donors have a right to withdraw from donation during the course of their life (O'Donnell, 2000) .
International transport
Banking allows the international import and export of donor oocytes. Clinics in countries with a donor shortage import gametes from countries with donors in surplus. The import and export of donor sperm has been standard practice for many years, and the number of donor oocytes which is transported between clinics is growing (Pennings and Gurtin, 2012) . Few articles in the literature address the transport of gametes, and oocytes in particular (Burrell, 2012; Deech, 1998; Heng, 2006 Heng, , 2007a Pennings and Gurtin, 2012; Pennings et al., 2007a) .
International transport of donor oocytes is considered beneficial for patients because it diminishes the need to travel abroad for treatment (Pennings and Gurtin, 2012) . Nonetheless, aiming to avoid malpractices and trade in oocytes, the ESHRE taskforce advises that clinics should not import oocytes that are collected from women abroad (Pennings et al., 2007a) . If clinics do import donor oocytes, the ESHRE taskforce proposes that the centre which imports the oocytes shares responsibility towards the foreign donor, and should verify whether the oocytes are obtained according to ethical standards (Pennings et al., 2007a) . It is also advised that the exchange of gametes between banks should not be a profit-making business, and good co-operation and feedback between the banks concerned is required (Deech, 1998) .
By contrast, some argue that if clinics cannot live up to the demand, then refraining from importing donor oocytes is unfair to recipients. Still, it is proposed that to ensure responsible import and export of oocytes, a coherent regulatory framework for the ethical recruitment of oocyte donors across international borders should be formulated (Heng, 2006) .
Distribution
This last section provides an overview of the ethical aspects related to the distribution of donor oocytes. Ethical aspects identified in the literature with regard to the access to treatment for recipients mainly evolve around the selection of recipients and 'cross-border reproductive care' (CBRC). Another identified aspect, but which is hardly addressed in the literature, is the prioritization of recipients in case the supply of donor oocytes is scarce. The final two identified aspects are the matching of recipients with donor oocytes, and the requirements for informed consent and counselling for recipients.
Access to treatment for recipients
Selection of recipients and the welfare of the child. The criteria for access to ART with donor oocytes for recipients mentioned in the literature are increasingly grounded in the expected wellbeing of the future child over the years (McWhinnie, 1998; Jones and Cohen, 2001; Pennings, 2001; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Byrd et al., 2002; van den Akker, 2006; Pennings et al., 2007b Pennings et al., , 2008 ASRM, 2013a ASRM, , 2013b Braverman, 2015; Zweifel, 2015) . As discussed above, the welfare of the child is evaluated on the basis of three thresholds (Table VI) . While the literature concerning donor selection seems to support the reasonable welfare standard, the larger part of the literature regarding recipient selection embraces the maximum welfare standard. A review article articulates the position that multiple clinics are convinced that 'a moral obligation exists to conceive children under the best conditions possible' (Braverman, 2015) . Many propose that examining the expected parental capabilities of recipients could optimize these conditions (Pennings, 2001; Pennings et al., 2007a Pennings et al., , 2007b Pennings et al., , 2008 Cook et al., 2013; ASRM, 2013b; Braverman, 2015) . Others argue that fertility professionals cannot hold double standards; the reasonable welfare standard should be used for both recipient and donor selection .
The discussion in the literature on recipient selection mainly revolves around the accessibility to treatment with donor oocytes of postmenopausal women (Schenker, 1993; Dean and Edwards, 1994; Marcus and Brinsden, 1996; Eisenberg and Schenker, 1997; Hamilton, 1998; Pennings, 2001; Soderstrom-Anttila et al., 2001; Maunder, 2004; Landau, 2005; Smajdor, 2008; Klein and Sauer, 2010; Vasireddy and Bewley, 2013; ASRM, 2013a; Schenker, 2012, 2014; Zweifel, 2015) . Several articles emphasize that late parenthood could negatively influence the welfare of the child, because of early parental death, and a low societal acceptance of parenthood at advanced age (Schenker, 1993; Dean and Edwards, 1994; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; ASRM, 2013a; Schenker, 2012, 2014; Zweifel, 2015) . Opponents contest these arguments by referring to the individual's right to procreate. Denying oocyte donation to postmenopausal women negates this fundamental right (Dean and Edwards, 1994; Pennings, 2001; Maunder, 2004; Landau, 2005; ASRM, 2013a; Londra et al., 2014; Schenker, 2012, 2014; Zweifel, 2015) . Five additional selection criteria for recipients are mentioned in the debate about ART for postmenopausal women. First is the expected medical risk for both mother and child (e.g. pregnancy-induced hypertension, gestational diabetes and caesarean sections) (Dean and Edwards, 1994; Schenker, 1995; Marcus and Brinsden, 1996; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Landau, 2005; Vasireddy and Bewley, 2013; ASRM, 2013a; Schenker, 2012, 2014; Zweifel, 2015) . The ASRM advices that women for whom pregnancy imposes elevated risks should be thoroughly screened and counselled by a physician experienced in the care of high-risk obstetrical patients (ASRM, 2013a) . Second, is the medical need or expected chances for successful treatment (Marcus and Brinsden, 1996; Pennings, 2001; Shufaro and Schenker, 2012) . Third, is the opportunity of experiencing parenthood (i.e. primary versus secondary infertility) (Pennings, 2001; Shufaro and Schenker, 2012) . Fourth, is nationality and whether to accept foreign patients (Pennings, 2001; van Hoof and Pennings, 2011) . Fifth, is the capacity to pay, since expensive treatment will ultimately result in limited access for recipients (Hamilton, 1998; Pennings, 2001; Shufaro and Schenker, 2012) .
Similar arguments are identified in the literature discussing the acceptability of ART for what are sometimes called 'non-nuclear families' (i.e. departing from the traditional heterosexual married couple), including single, gay, lesbian and trans-sexual patients (de Knoppers and Le Bris, 1993; Schenker, 1993; Hamilton, 1998; Jones and Cohen, 2001; van den Akker, 2006; Pennings, 2007; Dickenson, 2011; Burrell, 2012; Hostiuc, 2013; de Wert et al., 2014) . In countries in which treatment of these nonnuclear families is not allowed, 'relationship status' is identified as an additional selection criterion (Jones and Cohen, 2001 ). See Table VII for an overview of the selection criteria used for recipients, as published in the literature. The access of same-sex male couples to oocyte banks is particularly ethically controversial because of the involvement of a gestational surrogate (van den Akker, 2006) . The ethical concerns in relation to surrogacy largely correspond to the ethical aspects of oocyte donor recruitment (i.e. physical risks and psychosocial impacts, appropriate motivation and reasonable compensation, and anonymity and disclosure). However, a comprehensive overview of the ethical aspects of gestational surrogacy is outside the scope of this review.
Prioritization in case of scarce supply. Prioritization of recipients is considered an important ethical issue in countries in which the demand for ART with donor oocytes is high, but the supply is minimal (Pennings, 2001) . Although the principle of justice demands that oocyte banks establish carefully considered policies regarding prioritization, very little literature addresses this issue (Eisenberg and Schenker, 1997; Pennings, 2001; Klein and Sauer, 2010) . The limited literature shows that it is believed that donor oocytes are valuable and scarce, which should not go to waste. On that account it is proposed that recipients should be prioritized on their expected chances for successful treatment (Pennings, 2001) . One article that briefly addresses the issue of prioritization argues that young women who undergo menopause at a premature age (<40 years) should be prioritized over women who had menopause within the normal range (>40 years) because treatment with donor oocytes can be their only chance to achieve gestational motherhood (Eisenberg and Schenker, 1997) . However, others argue that prioritizing women with premature menopause over women who undergo menopause 'naturally', based on the argument that the second group of women 'have had their chance', is unjust. Both groups of women cannot be held accountable for the cause of their remaining desire to have children (Klein and Sauer, 2010) .
Other criteria for prioritization mentioned in the literature are waiting time, medical urgency, and phenotypic matching (Pennings, 2001) (Table VII) . The ASRM proposes to take into account the preferences of donors in allocating their oocytes to recipient parents, although it is emphasized that clinics should prevent the discrimination of recipient parents (ASRM, 2009).
Cross-border reproductive care. The legislation on ART and the availability of donor oocytes differ internationally. Patients from countries in which treatment with donor oocytes is not allowed, or inaccessible due to shortage or high costs, seek CBRC (Shenfield et al., 2010; ASRM, 2016b) . Multiple articles identify the ethical concerns related to CBRC. One ethical aspect identified in the literature is whether clinics have an obligation to treat patients from abroad (Pennings, 2001; Heng, 2007b; Pennings et al., 2008; Merlet, 2009; Inhorn, 2010; Blyth et al., 2011; Pennings and Gurtin, 2012; Shenfield, 2012; Pennings, 2011, 2012; van Hoof et al., 2015; ASRM, 2016b) . Some authors state that it is morally problematic if clinics treat large numbers of foreign patients, since this disadvantages local patients (Pennings, 2001; ASRM, 2016b) and disrespects the regulatory system of the country of origin (van Hoof et al., 2015) . Others argue that the duty of caregivers and the right to care of patients outweighs these concerns, and requires a tolerant attitude of clinics towards patients seeking treatment abroad (Pennings, 2001; van Hoof and Pennings, 2011; van Hoof et al., 2015) . A second aspect mentioned in the literature is that cross CBRC reinforces 'stratified reproduction': when only certain categories of people (e.g. individuals who are financially and/or geographically advantaged) are empowered to reproduce, while others are disempowered (Inhorn and Gürtin, 2011) . Furthermore, the literature proposes to at least inform patients considering treatment abroad about the risks and benefits, and to formulate international standards on CBRC van Hoof et al., 2015; Merlet, 2009 ).
Matching donor oocytes and recipients
Several studies discuss the practice of matching donors and recipients (Pennings, 2000 (Pennings, , 2001 Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Sauer and Kavic, 2006; de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008; ASRM, 2009; GilArribas et al., 2016; Klitzman, 2016; Wong, 2017) . While commercial oocyte banks provide recipients with an increased control in choosing phenotypic characteristics of the donor, non-commercial oocyte banks generally match only for minimal phenotypical characteristics (Pennings, 2000; Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Sauer and Kavic, 2006) . Moreover, the current scarcity of donor oocytes in many countries diminishes the possibilities for matching (Pennings, 2001; ASRM, 2009) . Still, some believe that the creation of oocyte banks will result in a greater choice in donor characteristics, which optimizes the matching of recipient parents and donor oocytes (de MeloMartin and Cholst, 2008; Pennings, 2000) .
There seems to be no consensus as to what extent of matching is desirable. It is either understood as a result of the commercialization of ART, or as a means to increase the autonomy of recipient parents (Pennings, 2000; Klitzman, 2016) : some argue for the latter and emphasize that ensuring the possibility for recipient parents to choose between donors increases recipients' control over their treatment process, and could help them in accepting the donor's role in 14, 18, 21, 75, 79, 81, 100, 107, 108, 111, 126, 129, 130, 134, 137 Medical risks 21, 51, 56, 75, 101, 107, 108, 111, 119, 126, 129 Chances for successful treatment 56, 79, 107 Primary versus secondary infertility 79, 107 Nationality 79, 116 Capacity to pay 34, 79, 107 Relationship status 15, 23, 34, 38, 43, 50, 81, 100, 115, 121, 134 Medical need Superscript numbers refer to the studies in Tables II-IV. the creation of their family (Pennings, 2000) . Others argue that facilitating matching by phenotypic characteristics stimulates normative judgements regarding non-nuclear families. Not prioritizing matching would reduce stigma and generate acceptance of alternative family structures (Wong, 2017) .
Informed consent and counselling of recipients
The last ethical aspect identified in the literature concerns the importance of sufficient informed consent and proper counselling for recipients during treatment with donor oocytes (Mahlstedt and Greenfeld, 1989; Pettee and Weckstein, 1993; Marcus and Brinsden, 1996; Reame, 1999 Reame, , 2000 Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; Schenker, 2005; van den Akker, 2006; Blyth et al., 2011; ASRM, 2013a; Benward, 2015; Braverman, 2015) . With regard to the informed consent of recipients, the literature emphasizes the importance of providing information about possible risks, and the expected effectiveness of the treatment to ensure an autonomous decision of recipients when starting treatment (Mahlstedt and Greenfeld, 1989; Reame, 1999 Reame, , 2000 van den Akker, 2006; de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008; Benward, 2015; van Hoof et al., 2015) . Some authors also argue that for recipients to sufficiently understand the implications of treatment with donor oocytes, it is important to inform them about the process of oocyte retrieval and cryopreservation of the donor oocytes (de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008; van Hoof et al., 2015) . The literature shows that due to the involvement of a third person, ART with donor oocytes asks for more thorough counselling of the recipient(s), in comparison with more general ART, such as IVF (Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; van den Akker, 2006; ASRM, 2013b) . It is proposed that recipients should be extensively counselled on the psychological impact of third-party ART, and the possible short-and long-term influences for parenting (i.e. how to deal with the issue of disclosure, as discussed above) (Söderström-Anttila et al., 2001; ASRM, 2013b) . The literature seems to suggest that counselling recipients is even more important-and most difficultwhen treatment was refused or unsuccessful (de Melo-Martin and Cholst, 2008; Zweifel, 2015) . Also, some articles articulate that counselling should be sensitive to recipients' different religious and cultural beliefs regarding third-party ART (Eisenberg and Schenker, 1997; Schenker, 2005 Schenker, , 2013 Wolowelsky and Grazi, 2014) .
Discussion
Based on a broad systematic review of the literature, we identified the ethical aspects arising in establishing and maintaining oocyte banks for third-party ART. The main ethical aspects are related to the intake of donor oocytes, which consider the interests of the donor as well as the future child. Ethical aspects related to the welfare of the donor are the medical and psychosocial risks of donation, motivation and reasonable compensation in donor recruitment, and requirements for informed consent. Ethical aspects related to the child are 2-fold: first, the reasonable welfare standard and donor selection, and second, anonymity and disclosure. We identified few ethical aspects with regard to the storage of donor oocytes for third-party ART in the literature. Therefore, we complemented our search with literature on oocyte banking for research purposes and biobanking. The main ethical aspects of storing donor oocytes are the quality standards and confidentiality, issues of ownership and control, and the international transport of donor oocytes. Identified ethical aspects of the distribution of donor oocytes concern the selection and prioritization of recipients, CBRC, matching of recipients and donor oocytes, and requirements for informed consent and counselling of recipients. Our review shows that numerous ethical aspects have to be taken into account when establishing and maintaining an oocyte bank. Yet, what is considered the correct approach towards many of these ethical aspects is a matter of debate. The first ethically sensitive components of oocyte banking, namely, the intake of donor oocytes, is still generally recognized. Nonetheless, we identified a gap in the existing literature with regard to the second and third component of oocyte banking, namely the long-term storage and distribution of donor oocytes.
An important observation of our review is that both donors and recipients are subjected to high standards. For example, the discussion concerning the desirability of improved genetic screening of oocyte donors demonstrates the practice's tendency to tip the scale from the reasonable welfare standard in favour of the maximum welfare standard. Another illustration of this tendency is the observation that a measure of maximization of the child's wellbeing is already considered when selecting recipients. This is exemplified in the debate addressing the access to ART with donor oocytes for non-traditional families, and postmenopausal women in particular. While indeed physicians in reproductive medicine have a responsibility to protect the future child from serious harm, the tendency to idealize the circumstances of conception is ethically questionable because it might jeopardise fair access. Besides, it could be that choices in donor and recipient selection are inexplicitly grounded in moral judgements about who is considered an 'appropriate donor' as well as an 'appropriate parent'. To establish ethically responsible and fair criteria for donor and recipient selection, critical evaluation of these assumptions is warranted.
A second important observation of our review is that the involvement of the oocyte donor seems to stop after she has successfully donated her oocytes (i.e. except for non-anonymous donors' responsibilities towards the donor child). For instance, while an oocyte donor is subordinated to the clinics' high standards, she has little say with regard to which recipient might receive her donated oocytes. Similarly, recipients endure an exhaustive selection process, but are hardly involved in the process of selecting donors (except at commercial oocyte banks). However, in the literature regarding biobanking the interests of the tissue donors after their donation is increasingly underlined. Questions about how donors can be treated as interested stakeholders by means of facilitating increased control over their donated tissue are being asked more often. Furthermore, so called 'benefit sharing', including sharing of information, providing financial benefits, and other measures that recognize the contributions of donors, are progressively proposed or implemented (Rothstein, 2005; O'Doherty et al., 2011) . Hence, we should evaluate whether the current model of (little to no) involvement of oocyte donors and recipients in oocyte banking for third-party ART is still desirable nowadays, or whether we should re-invent existing measures of recognition, input and control of both the oocyte donors and donor oocyte recipients.
Thirdly, our review of the literature demonstrates that the distribution component of oocyte banking, and the prioritization of recipients in case of scarcity in particular, receives little attention. An ethical analysis is necessary to examine to what extent substantial criteria can be formed or whether the pluralistic views as identified in our review allow only for a procedural prioritization. Since the scarcity of donor oocytes will probably not be resolved in the near future, discussion about what is considered a fair manner of distributing donor oocytes amongst recipients can no longer wait.
We believe our findings serve as an important starting point for different stakeholders in the field of ART to conceptualize what challenges could potentially arise when establishing and maintaining oocyte banks for third-party ART. Finally, our review demonstrates that the intake and distribution of donor oocytes are closely related components of oocyte banking. Policy makers and oocyte bank managers should be aware that choices made to assure the ethical intake of donor oocytes ultimately influence the practice of distribution, and vice versa. This interaction, accompanied by the continuing discussion about the right approach towards the ethical aspects of oocyte banking, requires a trustworthy and adaptive governance structure that involves all parties of interest (O'Doherty et al., 2011) . A first step would be to investigate the moral considerations and attitudes of different stakeholders of oocyte banks on how, according to them, the intake, storage and distribution of bank donor oocytes should be organized.
Limitations
To the best of our knowledge, this review is the first to put forward a comprehensive examination of the ethical aspects of oocyte banking for third-party ART, as provided by the literature. Our overview of the ethics of oocyte banking is limited in the sense that we did not include ethical aspects regarding the desirability of oocyte donation. Second, because we looked for articles with a thorough discussion of ethical aspects of oocyte banking for third-party ART, we chose to exclude a large number of articles if ethical aspects were not mentioned in title and abstract. As such, it is possible that we might have excluded relevant articles. Nonetheless, the goal of this review was to provide a comprehensive overview of the ethical aspects of oocyte banking, not of all the relevant literature (McDougall, 2013) . Third, since a limited number of articles in our search addressed the issue of long-term storage, we 'borrowed' the ethical aspects mentioned in the literature on oocyte banking for research purposes and biobanking. Although, both oocyte and biobanks engage in the intake, storage, and distribution of biomaterials, our choice for this analogy can be contested. A fundamental difference between both practices is the aim of the practice. While biobanks collect biomaterials for research purposes, the banking of donor oocytes is aimed at fertility treatment and the creation of a child. The practice of oocyte banking thus has an additional responsibility towards recipient parents and the children resulting from treatment. Lastly, oocyte donation regulations vary across countries, which influences the results and conclusions of studies. Therefore, awareness of the country of origin of included articles is of great importance when interpreting our results (Tables II-IV) .
Conclusion
The practice of oocyte banking for third-party ART consists of three components: the intake, storage and distribution of donor oocytes, each accompanied by many ethical challenges. The main ethical aspects are related to the wellbeing of the oocyte donors and the future child, while few aspects with regard to responsible storage and fair distribution of donor oocytes are identified. Accordingly, a significant gap in the existing literature should be acknowledged. An important observation is that current procedures of donor and recipient selection, as well as their degrees of involvement in these processes, might need reconsideration. To conclude, the interaction between policy choices concerning the intake and distribution of donor oocytes, and the continuing discussion regarding the right approach to the ethical aspects of oocyte banking, require a trustworthy and adaptive governance structure in which it is vital to involve all different stakeholders.
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